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ABSTRACT
One of important philosophical problems in environmental 
philosophy is the existential relation between man and 
nature. This mirrors the earlier relationship between 
man and nature as God’s creation. The core principle 
here is relationality.  Man and nature in modern thought 
are considered as separate substances with an abstract 
relation between the two. These divisions which emerge 
with Modern thought operate on the basis of rational 
distinctions and the attempt to substantiate and verify. 
Such an approach often isolates Nature as a distinct 
region of being, where nature is divided into parts and 
analyzed in isolation. With such analysis and reduction, the 
interrelationships and interconnectedness among beings as 
well as among parts of the whole disappear. As a result, 
nature is considered as a big machine, and being is treated 
as a static substance. Many modern Western philosophers 
consider being as  merely as a nominal concept. Contrary 
to this mainstream modern thought, the philosophers Mullā 
Ṣadrā and Whitehead hold that nature as well as the entire 
corporeal world is a substance in a continuous process of 
change and becoming. For Mullā Ṣadrā, nature in essence 
is a process of ‘trans-substantial motion’ (al-harakat al-
jawhariyyah).  This principle is derived from his reflection 
on the univocal meaning of being that brings about his 
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fundamental doctrines, i.e, the principiality of being (aṣalat 
al-wujūd) and the gradation of being (tashkīk al- wujūd). 
For Whitehead, the actual world is a process of becoming 
of actual entities. In accordance with his philosophical 
system, to explicate his thought, Whitehead coins the term 
of ‘actual occasions’ to denote all beings in the corporeal 
world. He rejects critically the mechanistic viewpoint of 
modern thought. This paper attempts to introduce several 
basic principles from Mullā Ṣadrā and Whitehead to 
provide an alternative philosophical foundation for the 
environmental movement. 
Keywords: Being; nNature; Mullā Ṣadrā; Whitehead; 
trans-substantial motion; environmental crisis
Introduction
Environmental destruction is one of the most serious problems 
facing the world today. From resource depletion and species extinction 
to pollution, the planet is struggling against manmade assaults which are 
unprecedented. This is aggravated by population explosion, industrial 
growth, technological manipulation, and military proliferation. Global 
warming and climate change, demonstrate that we are changing our planet 
in such a way that the basic elements which sustain life – fresh water, 
air, food, energy, land – are at risk. Accordingly, The Earth Charter3 
states that we stand at a critical moment in Earth’s history, a time when 
humanity must choose its future.
Over the past four decades, there has been a growing awareness as 
more scholars from a variety of disciplines have focused their attention 
on the environmental crisis.  They signal a potential paradigm shift from 
human history’s dis-enchantment of nature to a new re-enchantment 
of nature. Writers and researchers from many disciplines; scientists, 
philosophers, and humanists are attempting to construct values which 
reconnect us with nature. Many of these values can be seen as religious or 
spiritual.  Contrary to the modernist idea of a secularized, disenchanted, 
mechanistic, and meaningless world, contemporary environmentalists 
have found in nature an ultimate value and meaning.  Gregory Bateson 
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voiced, “We should now think as nature thinks”4 
Morris Berman criticized deeply the mechanistic world-view, 
which is embedded in modern science and thought, and described it 
variously as dis-enchantment, or non-participation because it insists on 
a rigid distinction between observer and observed.  He wrote, 
Scientific consciousness is alienated consciousness; there 
is no ecstatic merger with nature, but rather total separation 
from it.  Subject and object are always seen in opposition to 
each other. I am not my experiences, and thus not really a 
part of the world around me.  The logical end point of this 
worldview is a feeling of total reification: everything is an 
object, alien, not-me; and I am ultimately an object too, an 
alienated “thing” in a world of other, equally meaningless 
things.  This world is not of my own making; the cosmos 
cares nothing for me, and I do not really feel a sense of 
belonging to it.5
R.D. Laing as quoted by Fritjof Capra6 pointed out that we destroy 
the world in theory before we destroy it in practice.  This underlines the 
dangers of inappropriate paradigms, the crisis of perception, and the 
importance of moving toward a new worldview. According to Martin 
Palmer and Victoria Finlay7, if the environmental crises facing the world 
today were simply a matter of information, knowledge, and skills, then 
we would be able to escape these dangers. But this is not enough. He 
came to conclude that “…Ultimately, the environmental crisis is a crisis 
of the mind... We see, do, and are what we think, and what we think is 
shaped by our cultures, faiths, and beliefs.”
It is Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the eminent and prolific Iranian thinker, 
clearly advocated the need for a spiritual view for overcoming the 
environmental crisis.  Since 1960’s, long before the term ‘ecology’ became 
fashionable word today, Nasr analyzed the ecological crisis according to 
his understanding of perennial philosophy or philosophia perennis, which 
he related to a more traditional and spiritual cosmological perspective. 
He points out that the ecological crisis is a symptomatic of a spiritual 
and existential crisis of modern man.  He emphasizes the importance of 
re-sacralization of nature, and is critical of the way modern humanity 
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merely uses nature  – as one might ‘use’ a prostitute – benefiting from it 
without any sense of obligation and responsibility.8 He suggests that the 
modernist view of nature as a machine or mechanical order was based 
on the thesis that nature was devoid of intelligence and life.9 
This paper is presented to promote an understanding of nature 
which is relevant to the efforts of overcoming environmental crisis and 
problems created by mechanistic paradigms. By the term of nature, it 
means everything that there is in the corporeal world of experience. Nature 
refers to all things, matters, bodies, and parts of the universe surrounding 
human being with whom it enjoys interrelationship and interconnection. 
The world of nature is part of the world of being.  Consequently, 
once we are to grasp and understand the meaning of the existence of nature 
in connection with being, we are in need of understanding of the meaning 
of being. This can lead to a better understanding of nature that we dwell 
in, and the improvement of the environmental conditions we live in.
Just like reality, environmental issues and problems are 
multidimensional, interrelated, dynamic, and having different levels of 
complexity.  We are required to propose a school of thought which is 
able to accommodate different levels and realms of reality in integrated 
and proportional way such that it provides a more adequate solution to 
address ecological problem. 
This paper is aimed at exposing Mullā Ṣadrā’s systematic ontology 
and Whitehead’s cosmology. Before we investigate these thoughts 
however, we need to explore in brief the mechanistic picture of the world 
of nature in modern thought. 
The Mechanistic World View
Up until the Renaissance, religion and science were often 
considered to have a connection and conformity. But during the sixteenth 
century, skepticism appeared and influenced European scholars and 
philosophers to replace religious truth with a new secular foundation 
for this new science. In this Renaissance era, the interest in natural 
and empirical sciences intensified, and the discoveries of Copernicus, 
Kepler, and Galileo shook the foundations of Ptolemaic astronomy and 
Aristotelian natural philosophy, which had been accepted by the Church 
as certain and sacred. Consequently, Christian thinkers turned away from 
serious concern with a metaphysics and theology of nature; some of them 
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adopted whatever happened to be the prevalent scientific view and interpret 
it theologically.  Others, failing to support their religious doctrines through 
an appeal to nature, began to defend their religious doctrines by moving 
away from nature and science through an emphasis on faith.
Facing this serious challenging for philosophy, René Descartes, 
who is called “the father of modern philosophy”, set out to provide 
foundations for science, metaphysics, and religion to overcome 
skepticism. He formulated a way, in his opinion, by which we can 
overcome the strongest possible skeptical arguments through the certainty 
of the primary truth, namely, his famous principle: “cogito ergo sum” (I 
think, therefore I am).  Descartes explained that although one can doubt 
the existence of anything, one can never doubt their own thinking, and 
therefore their existence. In his own words, “Thinking is an attribute of 
the soul; and here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone 
is inseparable from me. I am – I exist. This is certain.”10
In fact, Descartes’ solution to skepticism resulted in the idea that 
our knowledge of the contents of our minds is more certain than our 
knowledge of things outside the mind. 
It also resulted in his principle of clarity and distinctness of ideas. 
Our certainty of the contents of our own thought are the basis of all other 
truths. He claimed that any idea is false unless it is clear and distinct. 
He said, 
We shall never err if we give our assent only to what we 
clearly and distinctly perceive.  What constitutes clear and 
distinct perception? I call that “clear” which is present and 
manifest to the mind giving attention to it, just as we are 
said clearly to see objects when, being present to the eye 
looking on, they stimulate it with sufficient force, and it 
is disposed to regard them; but the distinct is that which 
is so precise and different from all other objects as to 
comprehend in itself only what is clear.11
 
The application of the principle of clarity and distinctness led 
Descartes to have the complete demarcation mind as ‘thinking substance’ 
(res cogitans) and matter as ‘corporeal substance’ (res extensa). Matter 
was extended, divisible, spatial; mind was unextended, indivisible, and 
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non-spatial. The result is the theory known as Cartesian dualism. This 
theory also views that ‘the soul is entirely distinct from the body and 
would not fail to be what is even if the body did not exist’.12 The core 
idea of dualism in essence is total separation between two things, entire 
distinction between two entities, and complete disconnection between 
incorporeal things and corporeal substances. 
The principle of the clarity and distinctness of ideas was applied to 
extension as well.  The extended world becomes a multiplicity in essence. 
Reality is a collection of discrete and concrete entities without existential 
relation and continuity. There is no interrelation and interconnection 
among entities. All things are separated from one another by essential 
demarcations.
For Descartes, each substance is conceived in isolation from others. 
Water is water; it is not milk. Water and milk are essentially separate from 
one another. Substances for him are the solid entities, the self-subsistent 
things.  In his words, “Really the notion of substance is just this – that 
which can exist by itself, without the aid of any other substance.” 13 
Substance is ultimate building block of things. The trees, stones, houses, 
and cats are the ultimate reality of things. In Cartesian system, we do not 
find the difference between existence of water and ‘whatness’ of water. 
Later, Kant even held that existence is only nominal concept that our 
mind impose on reality. 
According to Thomas Reid, the impact of Descartes has been 
enormous. He said Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume shared “a 
common system of the human understanding” that may still be called 
the Cartesian system. This statement actually could be extended through 
the history of philosophy into modern times. Kant’s philosophy could 
be conceived as an elaborate Cartesian thought in deeper, broader, and 
more systematic manner. In addition, Reid observed that Descartes’ 
influence worked as much on empiricist philosophers as on those of his 
own rationalist temper. The influence on empiricism was perhaps the 
deeper of the two. It is because in the particular form of starting with the 
supposedly indubitable data of the individual consciousness, we see the 
effects of Descartes’ enterprise of making epistemology the starting point 
of philosophy.14  We can see that Locke came to divide physical objects 
into primary qualities (mass, volume) and secondary qualities (colour, 
odour) in which he said that the first is real and the later is not. Hume’s 
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atomistic thought was a radical form of building block of things that 
Descartes suggested. Using Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s words:
Although modern science did declare its dependence from 
a certain type of philosophy, it itself remains based upon a 
particular philosophical understanding of both the nature 
of the world and our knowledge of it, and that even an 
important element of Cartesianism has survived as part 
and parcel of the modern scientific worldview.15
 
The Implications of Cartesian Thought on Nature
As we see in the above-mentioned account, Cartesian thought that 
dominated the mainstream of modern philosophy can be summarized into 
some following characteristics:
(1) Dualism between mind and external reality; between subject 
and object; between mind and matter; between soul and body; 
between man and nature
(2) Reality is multiple in one horizontal plane (a ‘flat’ ontology) 
(3) Flat reality is disconnected and segmented 
(4) Solid and self-subsistent substance in isolation from others; 
there is no interrelation and interconnection between 
substances, things, entities.
(5) No clear distinction between existence and ‘whatness’ 
(quiddity) 
These assumptions of Cartesian thought are the ontological root 
causes of mechanistic picture on nature. This dualistic view had created 
a paradigm of the mechanization of nature in both theory and practice. 
Descartes’ conception of matter as an inert, dead substance, which 
undergoes mechanically explainable changes, makes the sharp contrast 
between the physical universe and the human mind. Descartes claimed 
that all physical phenomena can be explained in terms of the mechanical 
motion of matter. Descartes denied that animals have minds, and this belief 
led him to state that “all suffering is the result of Adam’s sin, so animal 
cannot suffer”. It was a justification for killing and abusing animals. Since 
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human mind was conscious, rational, and free, then human being is the 
sole subject in the universe; it was man’s task to make himself master 
and possessor of nature. 
Nasr points out that Cartesian dualism remained the prime 
occupation of later Western philosophers such as Hume, Kant, Berkeley, 
and Hegel, all of whom, despite their many differences, came to the 
same conclusion.16 For Kant, nature is nothing but disordered bits and 
pieces of material substances on which human mind imposed the order 
and regularity. For Hegel, nature in itself is ‘negativity’. It exists simply 
in order to be overcome, humanized.  Hegel said “Nature deserves 
appreciation only when it has been transformed into a farm, a garden, 
and so has lost its wildness.” 
As a result, we are faced with what Berman coins ‘dis-enchantment 
of the world’. Collingwood writes, “In every case their answer (Western 
philosophers) was at bottom the same: namely, that mind makes nature; 
nature is, so to speak, a by-product of the autonomous and self-existing 
activity of the mind.”17 Nasr writes that this even influenced the study of 
nature. He writes:  “Reduced to a machine by the new mental conception 
of what constituted physical reality, nature was to be studied by the human 
mind through laws that it was in the nature of the mind to understand, and 
God was reduced to the role of a millwright or a clockmaker, a role that also 
came to be considered as redundant by many of the later Newtonians.”18
The implications and consequences of Cartesian thought toward 
understanding of nature are as follows:
1. Nature is a big machine
2. Nature is flat, dull, and dead
3. Nature has no intrinsic value
4. Nature has no order, pattern and regularity unless human mind 
impose them on it
Mullā Ṣadrā Philosophy of Being
We can turn to the medieval philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā19 and 
the special place he  grants nature in his philosophical system. Unlike 
Cartesian system of philosophy that starts dealing with nature from parts 
to the whole and then tries to explain it based on quantitative approach 
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of nature, Mullā Ṣadrā‘s philosophy considers nature as the whole and 
moves then to the parts. In contrast to Cartesian philosophy that conceives 
nature as a sum of its disassociated parts, Mullā Ṣadrā regards nature as 
the whole which is greater than the sum of its parts. 
Sadrā’s cosmology in which the notion of movement occupies a 
central place is based on the principle of trans-substatial motion that every 
change in the world of nature, whether it is positional, spatial or temporal, 
is the outcome of an existential transformation in the very substance of 
things. Instead of seeing the physical world in a mechanistic way based 
upon quantitative equations, Sadra puts emphasis on the qualitative 
dimension of nature, 
Nature, in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, is considered as a kind 
of being whose essential characteristic (differentia) is the power of all 
beings in their combined motion. Nature is a changing substance in a 
continuous process of becoming.  Therefore, it is important to notice that 
the non-mechanistic picture of nature espoused by Sadra’s cosmology is 
higly relevant to the current environmental crisis, which is – according 
to environmentalist thinkers – is the catastrophic consequence of the 
mechanistic world-view.
Unlike Cartesian thought and even Aristotelean metaphysics, 
substance for Mullā Ṣadrā belongs to secondary philosophical intelligibles 
(al-ma’qulat al-thaniyyah al-falsafiyyah). This means that substance 
(jawhar) not included in “whatish” category, which is attained through 
abstraction of sense perception. Rather, it is obtained through comparison 
and rational analysis. For Ṣadrā, substance is a “structure of events” and 
a “process of change” rather than a building block of things. It is not a 
“thing” or “entity” that exists in state of constancy; rather, it is continously 
influx of change. 
In this regard, it is important to underline that Ṣadrā’s conceptions 
on substance, motion, and nature are ontological implications derived 
necessarily from his investigation of the meaning of being, which is a new 
chapter in the development of Islamic philosophy and more particularly 
ontology. Henry Corbin20 said that Mullā Ṣadrā did a revolution in 
metaphysics, and he called it ‘existential metaphysics” that differs from 
Aristotelian system.  It is also unlike Platonic metaphysical view that 
nothing exists but ideas or essence.  Mullā Ṣadrā  asserts that nothing is 
real but existence.
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Being, Motion, Nature
On the basis of his doctrine of being, Mullā Ṣadrā  puts forward an 
original idea, i.e., the doctrine of trans-substantial motion (al-harakat al-
jawhariyyah). He asserts that not only accidents (quantity, quality, space, 
position) but also substance is continuously in a state of motion (gradual 
change). Accidental changes themselves imply the necessity of substantive 
motion. In addition, all corporeal beings are in time; hence, they have 
a temporal dimension meaning that they have gradual existence.21 Each 
corporeal being is always in flux. 
The idea of motion-in-substance, in fact, is derived from Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s reflection on the univocal meaning of being (existence; wujūd)22 
that brings about his fundamental doctrines, i.e, the principality of being 
(aṣālat al-wujūd)23 and the gradation of being (tashkīk al-wujūd). The 
principality of being/existence means the primacy of existence (wujūd) 
over essence (māhiyah). What is meant by essence (māhiyah) is the 
particular sense or “quiddity.”24 
The ‘principality of existence,’ which is one of the central themes 
of Ṣadrā’s ontology, is based on three basic characteristic of existence; 
they are ‘the self-evident concept of existence (badīhī),’ ‘the univocal 
meaning of existence,’ and ‘the distinction between the concept and reality 
of existence.’  By intuition, Ṣadrā insists, there is nothing outside existence, 
and the meaning of existence cannot be based on anything other than 
itself. This is because, Ṣadrā explains, existence is the most general and 
inclusive of all things, it has no genus, no differentia and no definition.25 
Inner reality of existence (inniyyah al-wujūd) in its presence 
and inner revelation is  most evident of all entities, whereass 
its essence (māhiyah) is the most hidden in concept and 
in its inner-being. Its notion (mafhūm) is the richest of all 
entities in description in its manifestation and clarity. It is 
the most general of all entities with respect to its existence.    
It cannot be described (defined) because description is due 
to either a definition or a (distinguishing) mark. Thus, it 
cannot be described by definition. Since it has neither a 
genus nor differentia, it does not have a definition.26
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Ṣadrā’s distinction between the concept (mafhūm) and reality 
(ḫaqīqah) of existence can be depicted as an extension of the distinction 
between the order of thought and the order of being. Ṣadrā writes, 
“Existence as a concept is a generic term predicated of concrete exstents 
univocally, not equivocally.”27 What the mind perceives of the reality of 
existence is only its mental representation, and this further removes us 
from the actual reality of things as they are. 
Every external existent represented in the mind with its 
reality ought to maintain its quiddity despite the change 
in its modality of existence. The reality of existence is 
such that it is in the extra-mental world. Everything whose 
reality is such that it is in the extra-mental world cannot be 
found in the mind as it is; otherwise this would lead to the 
alteration of something from its own reality into something 
else. Therefore the reality of existence cannot be found 
in nay mind. What is represented of existence in the soul 
whereby it takes on universality and generality is not the 
reality of existence but one aspects of its constitution and 
one of its names.28
On the basis of discerning the concept and reality of existence, 
Ṣadrā states that existence is not a property of things by which we define 
them; rather it is the very reality by virtue of which things exist.29 He 
clarifies further as follows,
Existence, insofar as it is existence, has no agent from which 
it emanates, no matter into which it transforms, no subject 
in which it is found, no form by which it is clothed, no goal 
for which it is established. Rather, it itself is the agent of 
all agents, the form of all forms, and the goal of all goals.30
The reality of anything is its existence, which ranks with 
its effect and implications. Existence, therefore, must be 
the most real of all things for it is the possessor of reality, 
because whatever possesses reality, possesses reality only 
due to it. It (existence) is the reality of anything possessing 
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reality. For its ontic status as the possessor of reality is 
not in need of any other reality. It is determined due to its 
inner-reality (fi-l a’yan). Other entities – namely essences 
(māhiyāt) – are determined due to it and not due to their 
own inner-natures.31 
 
Thus Ṣadrā’s principality of being contends that flux is a mode of 
being in which each corporeal being comes gradually into existence and 
lapse out of existence.  Since the being of an object involves the object 
itself, and the object itself is a mutable existent, it follows that motion is 
a mode of being.  It means that the object is something-with-motion, not 
something in motion. 
For Mullā Ṣadrā, therefore, motion is an ontological concept. 
Motion is related to existence as an analytic accident, and the relating of 
it to the ‘whatness’ of a substance or accident is an accidental relation. 
Analytic accidents do not require independent subjects; rather their 
existence is identical with the existence of their subjects. In other words, 
motion originates from the object itself, not from external factors. For 
Ṣadrā, motion is a mode of exstence. Reality of existence is dynamic, 
flux, and always continuously renewal and change  (al-tajaddud wa’l-
inqidhā’).32
As for the his main idea on the trans-substantial motion (al-harakat 
al-jawhariyyah),  Ṣadrā says, 
Motion is the renewal of event, not a renewed event. The 
permanence of motion is not like the occurrence of an 
accident for a subject; rather, it is like the relationship 
of differentia to genus. Motion is not the changed and 
renewal thing but the change and renewal itself just like 
immobility is not the immobile thing but the immobility 
of thing. The meaning of motion being in a category is that 
the subject (the substance) is bound to change gradually, 
and not suddenly, from one species to another or from one 
class to another.33 
In Fazlur Raẖman words, Mullā Ṣadrā‘s theory of motion rests 
on the concept of a continuous structure of spatio-temporal events. Solid 
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bodies are liquidated and analyzed into a factor of pure potentiality 
of movement called matter and an actualizing factor variously called 
“physical realm” or “bodily nature” which is continuously changing and 
giving rise to a continuum of movement. A “thing” for Mullā Ṣadrā is, 
therefore, a particular “structure of events” thanks to the continuity of 
movement. In reality, there is nothing but the flow of forms.34
Implications of Ṣadrā’s Thought
Accordingly, the notion of motion (al-harakat) occupies a central 
place in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of nature. Every change in the world 
of nature is the outcome of an existential transformation in the very 
substance of things. Motion, like the flux of nature, is not an accident of 
the body; rather, it is one of the principles of it, because the existence of 
nature is changeable and nature is differentia of the body and prior to it. 
The entire corporeal world, both the celestial spheres and the world 
of the elements, constantly renews itself. The ‘matter’ of corporeal things 
has the power to become a new form at every instant; and the resulting 
matter-form complex is at every instant a new matter ready for moving 
toward another form, which is more perfect. Ṣadrā writes, 
The universe, including everything in it, is a temporal 
occurence since everything in it  existentially preceded 
by temporal non-existence; which means that for each 
individual identity its state of non-existence precede its 
existence, and the existence of a state of non-existence (for 
each individual) is prior in time (to its state of esistence). In 
general, every material object, whether it is the material of 
the stars or the elements, whether soul or body, constantly 
acquires new identity and its personality and its existence 
is never fixed.35  
Murtaḍa Muṭahhari, an Iranian contemporary philosopher whose 
thought is mainly influenced by Ṣadrā, points out that
Through the principle of substantial motion, the visage of 
the Aristotelian universe is wholly transformed. According 
to the principle of substantial motion, nature or matter 
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equals motion. Time consists in the measure or tensile 
force of this substantial motion, and constancy equals 
supernatural being (Supreme Being). What exists consists 
of, on the one hand, absolute change (nature), and, on the 
other, absolute constancy (Supreme Being). The constancy 
of nature is the constancy of order, not the constancy of 
being (existents), and the contents of the system are all 
mutable.36
In line with Mullā Ṣadrā’s cosmology, nature cannot be reduced 
to pure quantity because there is no such thing as pure quantity given the 
fact every change in the world of nature is the outcome of an existential 
transformation in the very substance of things. Each existent and entity 
in the universe is essentially transformable, and all parts are continuously 
in the process of creation and annihilation.  Ibrahim  Kalin, a Turkish 
contemporary philosoper studying Ṣadrā’s thought, summarizes Ṣadrā’s 
cosmology as follows:
Ṣadrā’s highly complex and original theory of nature yields 
a number of important results. First of all, Ṣadrā does away 
with Aristotelian notion of a solid substratum as the basis 
of change and renewal in the world of nature. Instead, he 
resolves the realm of physical bodies into “a process of 
change” by introducing the notion of change-in-substance. 
Construed as such, the world of nature becomes a play of 
contingencies while preserving its ‘substantial’ unity and 
integrity. Anticipating the quantum view of the physical 
world, Ṣadrā offers a new interpretation of the world of 
nature without necessarily upholding any solid or gross 
material substratum as the basis of physical entities.37
This is the first implication of Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought on nature, i.e., 
he proposes the holistic view that the whole world is the basis for existence 
and understanding of its parts. The universe as a whole system defines 
the entity and identity all of its parts. The nature of the whole is different 
from and beyond the mere sum of its parts. This way of understanding of 
nature is espoused by modern physics after relativity theory and quantum 
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physics appeared in the early 20th century.  One important implication 
of quantum physics is the holistic view on nature and the wholeness of 
reality.38 Quantum physics treats the world as a dynamic and ever-changing 
system. Particles are pattern of vibration that are continually being created 
and destroyed. Matter appears as energy, and vice versa.  All existence is 
impermanent and in ceaseless motion. 
The next implication is that Mullā Ṣadrā suggests that all parts in 
nature are interconnected and interrelated. All natural systems are wholes 
whose specific structures arise from interactions and interdependence of 
their parts. It is not the case that time and space are independent of each 
other; rather, they are interdependent on the basis of timeless and placeless 
the whole world. Given that motion in substance takes place with the 
change of an existent from one condition to another one, which is more 
perfect, then there will be no fixed and isolated substance.  Substance, 
in its gradual increase in perfection, is a temporal unique being which 
is continual in one sense, and is connected gradually in another sense. It 
means there is interconnectedness in different levels of existence (plurality 
in unity; non-flat ontology).  Consequently, nature in essence is the very 
movement. 
Other implications of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of being on 
nature is that the universe is alive. Contrary to Descartes who holds the 
universe as a big machine, Mullā Ṣadrā respects the universe as a living 
being having a kind of awareness. Based on trans-substantial motion, the 
constant and perpetual movement in the world of ‘material’ entities, the 
demarcation line between the living and the dead is eliminated. Because 
it is motion, which is a mode of being, that defines and identifies all 
entities and identities. 
Given that the doctrines of the principality of being and the 
gradation of being, then the only principal reality is being, which 
permeates all particles and parts of the world, and the specific existents 
are distinguished from each other by their levels of perfection and 
imperfection. In other words, the terms of living and dead beings are 
not the static categories; rather, they indicate the level of perfections in 
terms of ontology. Awareness and life are not only among ontological 
perfections but are also the same as existence. Accordingly, like existence, 
they permeate all particles of the world. Even inanimate bodies are alive 
and aware existents.39 In this regard, Mullā Ṣadrā quotes a Qur’ānic verse: 
Husain Heriyanto and Hairunnisa 43
We have made of water everything living” (Ṣūra Al-Anbiyā: 30).
Similar to the Proclus’ doctrine of sympatheia, Mullā Ṣadrā adopts 
an essential relation between ‘love’ and ‘life.’ The love of perfection 
has been assigned to the essence of all existents of the world and the 
innermost particles of existence. The love of reaching the final perfection 
permeates all constituents and parts of the world. All the restlessness and 
motion existing in all the particles of the world originates from the power 
of love of pure perfection. Because of this power of love to permeate all 
things, then life and awareness is meaningless and inconceivable without 
it. Therefore, the power of life and awareness flows in all existents and 
particles of existents. Mullā Ṣadrā says explicitly, al-’ishq fī kulli al-ashyā 
(love exists in everything).40
The last implication of Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought that we can discuss 
here is that the approach to the qualitative dimension of nature discovers 
the order and the pattern subsisting the whole system. In contrast to 
mechanistic viewpoint, in Mullā Ṣadrā’s system of philosophy, nature 
has such intrinsic value as being alive, having awareness, having pattern 
and the order. Gregory Bateson espouses enthusiastically this way of 
understanding nature; he says, “The pattern and order are immanent in the 
world. It is the pattern which connects all things in the world. Breaking 
the pattern destroys all quality of the world”.41
We may summarize the above discussion. The implications and 
consequences of Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought toward understanding of nature 
are as follows:
1. Nature is a living and dynamic system 
2. Nature is continuously changeable, and even the very motion 
in essence 
3. Nature is characterized with interrelation and interconnection 
among its parts
4. Nature has order, pattern, and regularity 
Whitehead’s Process Philosophy 
There are interesting resonances between this thought of Mullā 
Ṣadrā and the thought of Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead wrote in 
the era of new scientific findings and theories such as relativity theory 
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and quantum physics. He is a philosopher with a familiarity with 
contemporary scientific development. His book entitled Science and the 
Modern World criticized the philosophical assumptions of modern science 
such as scientific materialism, positivism, and mechanistic viewpoint. He 
says, “In the scheme of early modern scientific thought, nature is a dull 
affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material, 
endlessly, meaninglessly”.42
 Whitehead’s critique of philosophical basis of modern science 
starts from the examination of the meaning of substance. He explains that 
modern science occupies the unquestioned acceptance of the Aristotelian 
meaning of substance as ‘the ultimate substratum which is no longer 
predicated of anything else’.43 Based on this simplistic meaning, the 
modern scientific basic concepts were established such as matter, space, 
time, and motion in the efforts of grasping nature.  
Whitehead rejects the meaning of substance Descartes defines as 
‘the notion of substance is just this – that which can exist by itself’ because 
it is not compatible with the interrelationship and interconnectedness 
prevailing among entities and elements in the universe. Also he refutes 
John Locke’s description of substance as ‘something I know not what’ 
given that it is not congruent with reality which is always in flux and 
continuous process of change.
To disprove materialistic mechanism view, Whitehead introduces 
the idea what he calls the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’.44 He explains 
that there has been a general tendency in modern thought to make a fatal 
fallacy which mistakes the abstract for the concrete realities. This fallacy 
is the occasion of great confusion in philosophy.  Empiricists hold that 
matter is something fixed, clear, and distinct that has a simple location in 
definite space and time; in fact, according to Whitehead, it is the outcome 
of abstraction. The universe is characterized as something complex, 
dynamic, and interrelated among its parts. For Whitehead, the concept of 
matter as the substance whose attributes we perceive is a simplification 
and, in turn, a failure to comprehend the universe as a changeable system.
Process Philosophy of the Organism
Whitehead’s fierce refutation toward the concept of substance 
as the fixed substratum leads him to establish a school of philosophy 
which promotes the primacy of change and process rather than stability 
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and solid structure. He writes his masterpiece, Process and Philosophy, 
to introduce a new cosmology; he calls his school ‘the philosophy of 
organism’. He delineates, 
The aim of the philosophy of organism is to express a 
coherent cosmology based upon the notions of ‘system’, 
‘process’, ‘creative advance into novelty’, ‘stubborn 
fact’, ‘individual unity of experience’, ‘feeling’, ‘time as 
perpetual perishing’, ‘endurance as re-creation’, ‘purpose’, 
‘universals as forms of definiteness’, ‘particulars as ultimate 
agents of stubborn fact’. The notion of ‘organism’ has two 
interconnected meanings, namely the microscopic meaning 
and the macroscopic meaning. The microscopic meaning is 
concerned with the formal constitution of an actual occasion 
considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of 
experience. The macroscopic meaning is concerned with the 
givenness of the actual world, considered as the stubborn 
fact which at once limits and provides opportunity for the 
actual occasion.45
 
He exposes the cosmological implications of mechanistic 
worldview that characterized modern thought since the seventeenth 
centuries.  Rather than describing the nature in an atomic, mechanic, and 
quantitative way, he puts forward the description of the nature, which is 
alive, organic, and full of qualitative meaning.  He suggests considering the 
universe as “an organism” and rejects the Cartesian-Newtonian-Kantian 
thought in describing the universe as “a big machine”.  In order to introduce 
his school of thought in cosmology, he coins a few key terms (new words 
or new meaning terms) particularly in Process and Philosophy such as 
‘actual entities’, ‘actual occasions’, ‘creativity’, ‘principle of relativity’, 
‘organic process’, ‘becoming of continuity’, ‘nexus’, ‘prehension’, 
‘feeling’, ‘concrescence’, ‘transition’, ‘extensive connection’.
In Whitehead’s system of philosophy, ‘actual entities’ is the most 
fundamental existential category. He describes,
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Actual entities are the final real things of which the world 
is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to 
find anything more real. They differ among themselves: 
God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff 
of existence in far-off empty space. Though there are 
gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet 
in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the 
same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and 
these actual entities are drops of experience, complex, and 
interdependent.46 
Actual entities sometimes are called ‘actual occasions’ in order 
to emphasize the process. Whitehead says, “That the actual world is a 
process, and that the process is the becoming of actual entities. Thus 
actual entities are creatures; they are also termed ‘actual occasions.’ 47
As an ontological principle, actual entities serve as an explanatory 
principle on reality. One of universal principles which is pertinent to all 
actual entities is the principle of process. This principle states that any 
being is determined by how it creates itself in the process being itself. 
Whitehead says, “That how an actual entity becomes constitutes what 
that actual entity is. Its ‘being’ is constituted by its ‘becoming’. This is 
the ‘principle of process.’ 48  By this principle, Whitehead maintains the 
primacy of becoming rather than ‘being’ as something fixed and stable. 
He points out that ‘becoming’ is the primary reality and ‘being’ is the 
secondary one. For this reason, Whitehead’s thought is also called ‘process 
philosophy.’
Based on the principle of process, Whitehead introduces another 
fundamental principle, namely, the principle of creativity. He elucidates,
‘Creativity’ is the universal of universals characterizing 
ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which 
the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the 
one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively.  It 
lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex 
unity. ‘Creativity’ is the principle of novelty. An actual 
occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the 
‘many’ which it unifies.49 
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Implication of Whitehead’s Thought on Nature
In relation to our discussion on the way of understanding of nature, 
Whitehead holds that the process takes place in an organic way, what 
is called the organic process. This process implies the interconnected 
activities in the creation and embodiment of any entity. The whole is not 
equivalent to the sum of its parts. Each part in the whole system constitutes 
all activities of the system as the unit. In this creation, he introduces 
three ideas, i.e., the principle of relativity, the doctrine of nexus, and the 
principle of pan-subjectivity. The principle of relativity asserts that there 
is internal interdependence and interrelationship among entities in the 
world; an actual entity is present for others. Whitehead explains, 
The principle of universal relativity directly traverses 
Aristotle’s dictum, ‘A substance is not present in a subject’.  
On the contrary, according to this principle an actual entity 
is present in other actual entities.  In fact if we allow for 
degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we must 
say that every actual entity is present in every other actual 
entity.  The philosophy of organism is mainly devote to 
the task of making clear the notion of ‘being present in 
another entity’50
 
The doctrine of nexus is related to the characteristic of organism. 
Whitehead believes that the world is an organism in which all actual 
entities are interconnected in a nexus (web). He articulates,
An actual world is a nexus.51 The community of actual 
things is an organism; but it is not a static organism. The 
expansion of the universe is respect to actual things is the 
first meaning of ‘process’; and the universe in any stage 
of its expansion is the first meaning of ‘organism.’ In this 
sense, an organism is a nexus.52 
It is interesting that, for Whitehead, the principle of organism is 
applicable for any system, not only living creatures. He elucidates, 
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The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that 
the plan of the whole influences the very characters of 
the various subordinate organisms which enter into it. 
In the case of an animal, the mental states enter into the 
plan of the total organism and thus modify the plans of 
the successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate 
smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached. Thus an 
electron within a living body is different from an electron 
outside it, by reason of the plan of the body. The electron 
blindly runs either within or without the body; but it runs 
within the body in accordance with its character within 
the body; that is to say, in accordance with the general 
plan of the body, and this plan includes the mental state. 
But the principle of modification is perfectly general 
throughout nature, and represents no property peculiar to 
living bodies.53
The above explanation reveals the holistic view that Whitehead 
advocates. He also underlines the internal relation between mental faculty 
and body, between living and inanimate beings. In this regard, he proposes 
the doctrine of pan-subjectivity, namely, each actual entity whether living 
being or un-living one must be considered and respected as a subject; 
all are the subjects. According to Whitehead, ‘subjectivity’ is a character 
of any actual entity. Each actual entity is a specific occasion that has a 
unique experience in the history of creation and embodiment. For him, 
nothing exists without meaning; rather, all actual entities have intrinsic 
value. He explores,
This principle (the principle of subjectivity) states that it 
belongs to the nature of ‘being’ that it is a potential for 
every becoming. Thus all things are to be conceived as 
qualifications of actual occasions. That how an actual entity 
becomes constitutes what that actual entity is. This principle 
states that the being is constituted by its becoming. The 
way in which one actual entity is qualified by other actual 
entity is the ‘experience’ of the actual world enjoyed by 
that actual entity, as subject. The subjectivist principle is 
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that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in 
the analysis of the experience of subjects. Process is the 
becoming of experience.54 
Based on the above discussion, we can list the implications and 
consequences of Whitehead’s thought toward understanding of nature 
as follows:
1. Nature is an organism 
2. Nature is always in the process of becoming
3. Nature is a nexus of interrelationship and interconnectedness 
4. Nature is subject that has intrinsic value and meaning 
Conclusion
Mullā Ṣadrā and Whitehead holistic and process philosophy shares 
ideas for understanding nature in deeper and more adequate way.  It 
sees nature as a process of which we are a part, rather than a machine or 
substance to be used and manipulated. This approach resonates with many 
contemporary thinkers who wish to employ insights of recent scientific 
theories – for instance, the theory of relativity, quantum physics, theory 
of dissipative structure, Gaia theory, complexity theory chaos theory, 
and fuzzy logic –  but search for a philosophical foundation upon which 
to employ them.
  
50   Prajñā Vihāra Vol. 22 no. 1 January to June
ENDNOTES
1  Husain Heriyanto is a faculty member of Master Program of Islamic Studies at 
Paramadina University, Jakarta. He is in charge of teaching the course of Environmental 
Philosophy at Postgraduate Program of Environmental Sciences, University of Indonesia 
in Jakarta. Email: husain_heri@yahoo.com
2 Hairunnisa is a faculty member of Communication Science at Mulawarman 
University, Samarinda, East Kalimantan. She has been involved with research at the 
Conservation Communication for ‘orangutan’ in Kalimantan island.
3 The Earth Charter is an international declaration of fundamental principles 
for building a just, sustainalble and peaceful world; please, see http://www.earthcharter.
org.
4 Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature (London: Wildwood House, Books, 
1979), 17.
5 Berman, Morris Berman. The Re-enchantment of the World (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1984), 3.
6 Capra, Fritjof. The Web of Life (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 19.
7 Palmer, Martin and Finlay, Victoria. Faith in Conservation: New Approaches 
to Religions and the Environment (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2003), 11
8 See Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern 
Man (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976), 18
9 See Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Religion and the Order of Nature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 131
10  See Descartes’s work, Meditation Part 2  translated by John Veitch (London: 
J.M. Dent & Sons, 1960), 88.
11  René Descartes,  The Principles of Philosophy, translated by John Veitch 
(London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1960),  182
12 Ibid. A Discourse on Method, 27
13  See Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 8 (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 38
14 Reid’s remark can be found in Bernard Williams’ essay, René Descartes  in 
Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 1 (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., 1967),  354
15 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Religion and the Order of Nature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 158
16 Ibid., 131
17 Collingwood. The Idea of Nature (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949),  7
18 Nasr (1996), 131
Husain Heriyanto and Hairunnisa 51
19 Mulla Sadra is a popular name of  Muhammad bin Ibrahim Sadr al-Din al-
Shirazi (1571 – 1640), who is one of the most prominent figure of post-Avicenna in 
history of Islamic philosophy. His school of thought called “transcendent wisdom” (al-
ḫikmat al-muta’āliyah) has made a great impact on later Islamic philosophy. A number 
of modern and Western philosophers have taken a study in depth on Mulla Sadra’s 
philosophy such as Henry Corbin, William Chittick, Toshihiko Izutsu, James Morris, 
David Burrel, Oliver Leaman, Legenhausen, and Joseph Lumbard.
20 Henry Corbin (1903-1978) is  a French philosopher who vastly studied Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s philosophy. See his essay “La place de Molla Sadra Shirazi dans la philosophy 
Iranienne”, Studia Islamica 18: 81-113 ( Paris, 1962).
21 Misbāh Yazdī, Philosophical Instruction (traslation of M. Legenhausen and 
A. Sarvdalir from Amūzesh-i-falsafa) (New York: Binghamton University, 1999), p. 
478.
22 Scholars studying Mullā Ṣadrā commonly translated the term al-wujūd into 
being or existence in synonimous meaning.
23  Several terms used by scholars studying Mullā Ṣadrā for aṣālat al-wujūd 
are principality of existence (Seyyed Hossein Nasr, William Chittick, James Morris), 
fundamentality of existence (Toshihiko Izutsu, Legenhausen), priority of existence 
(Henry Corbin), primacy of existence (Ibrahim Kalin), primordial univocal of existence 
(Mehdi Hairi Yazdi). 
24 Essence (māhiyah) in the general sense is actually not opposed to existence 
because existence itself has an essence in this sense. 
25 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Hikmah al-Muta’āliya fi-l-Aṣfār al-‘Aqliyyah al-Arba’ah 
(Beirut: Dar Iẖya al-Turath al-‘Arabī, 2002), Vol. 1, p. 53.
26 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Mashā’ir, translated by Parviz Morewedge (New York: 
SSIPS, 1992), 6.
27 Mullā Shadrā, Asfār, Vol. 1, p. 61
28 Mullā Shadrā, Asfār, Vol. 1, p. 63
29 Mullā Shadrā, Asfār, Vol. 1, hal. 65
30 Mullā Shadrā, Asfār, Vol. 1, hal. 77
31 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Mashā’ir, translated by Parviz Morewedge (New York: 
SSIPS, 1992), 10.
32 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Hikmah al-Muta’āliya fi-l-Aṣfār al-‘Aqliyyah al-Arba’ah 
(Beirut: Dar Iẖya al-Turath al-‘Arabī, 2002), Vol. 3, p. 49-50.
33 Mullā Ṣadrā, Aṣfār,  Vol. 3, p. 67.
34 Fazlur Raẖman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā  (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1975), p. 94-97
35 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Mashā’ir, translated by Parviz Morewedge (New York: 
SSIPS, 1992), 80.
52   Prajñā Vihāra Vol. 22 no. 1 January to June
36 Murtaḍa Muṭahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought: God, Man, and the 
Universe (Berkeley, Mizan Press, 1985), 169
37 Ibrahim Kalin, Between Physics and Metaphysics: Mulla Sadra on Nature 
and Motion (Tehran: Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, 2001 Vol. 1), 301-
327.
38 See Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (New York: Harper and 
Row Publishers, 1958).
39 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Aṣfār (Beirut: Dar Iẖya al-Turath al-‘Arabī, 2002), Vol. 6, 
p. 102.
40 Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Aṣfār (Beirut: Dar Iẖya al-Turath al-‘Arabī, 2002), Vol. 7, 
p. 145-147
41 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature (London: Wildwood House, 1979), p. 8
42  A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press, 
1967), 54
43 A.N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 18
44 A.N. Whitehead (1967), 51
45 A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 
128-129.
46 A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978),  18
47 Ibid. p. 22
48 A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 23.
49 Ibid. p. 21.
50  A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 
50
51 Ibid. p. 28
52 Ibid. p. 215.
53 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press, 
1967), p. 79.
54 A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 
166.
REFERENCES
Bateson, Gregory. Mind and Nature. London: Wildwood House, 1979)
Berman, Morris. The Re-enchantment of the World. New York: Bantam 
Books, 1984)
Capra, Fritjof. The Web of Life (London: HarperCollins, 1996)
Collingwood. The Idea of Nature. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949)
Husain Heriyanto and Hairunnisa 53
Corbin, Henry “La place de Molla Sadra Shirazi dans la philosophie 
Iranienne”, Studia Islamica 18: 81-113. Paris, 1962)
Descartes, René.  The Principles of Philosophy, translated by John Veitch 
(London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1960)
Edwards, Paul (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 8 (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967
Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper and 
Row Publishers, 1958)
Kalin, Ibrahim. Between Physics and Metaphysics: Mulla Sadra on Nature 
and Motion. Vol 1. (Tehran: Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research 
Institute, 2001)
Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Hikmah al-Muta’āliya fi-l-Aṣfār al-‘Aqliyyah al-Arba’ah. 
Beirut: Dar Iẖya al-Turath al-‘Arabī, 2002)
Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Aṣfār. Beirut: Dar Iẖya al-Turath al-‘Arabī, 2002)
Mullā Ṣadrā, al-Mashā’ir, translated by Parviz Morewedge. New York: 
SSIPS, 1992)
Muṭahhari, Murtaḍa. Fundamentals of Islamic Thought: God, Man, and 
the Universe. Berkeley, Mizan Press, 1985)
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Religion and the Order of Nature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996)
Palmer, Martin and Finlay, Victoria. Faith in Conservation: New 
Approaches to Religions and the Environment (Washington DC: 
The World Bank, 2003)
Raẖman, Fazlur. The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā,  Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1975)
_____. Meditations Part 2  translated by John Veitch (London: J.M. Dent 
& Sons, 1960)
Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality. New York: The Free 
Press, 1978)
54   Prajñā Vihāra Vol. 22 no. 1 January to June
_____.  Science and the Modern World. New York: The Free Press, 1967)
_____. The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982)
Williams, Bernard. “Rene Descartes” in Paul Edwards (ed.), The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 1 (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., 1967)
Yazdī, Misbāh. Philosophical Instruction (translated by M. Legenhausen 
and A. Sarvdalir from Amūzesh-i-falsafa) (New York: Binghamton 
University, 1999)
